Afghanistan, NATO, And The Problem Of Pervez

Earlier today, in an interview with CNN, President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan was able to talk about what is, currently, the most sobering aspect of the "War on Terror" - namely that, while we have significantly turned things around in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has, simultaneously, begun to slowly worsen. There appear to be two main reasons why this is the case, one of which President Karzai hit on in his CNN interview and the other of which was noted recently by Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

The first problem in Afghanistan, which Secretary Gates talked about in the LA Times not too long ago, is that non-American NATO troops are, to be blunt, ineffective. They, like many of the US troops who first went into Iraq, have little or no experience in counter-terrorism warfare; and thus, struggle with combat operations. However, the problem with NATO troops extends beyond the soldiers simply being 'green' (indeed, if that were the case, it would hardly be either unexpected or insurmountable); the problem is that other NATO troops, especially the European ones, are overburdened with very restrictive Rules of Engagement.

One of the biggest problems with counterinsurgency is the inability, while engaged in operations, to distinguish between enemy combatants, neutral civilians and friendly locals. Consequently, when archaic European definitions of combatants and civilians (from all of those conferences they've held in response to the atrocities of WWII) are applied to the modern battlefield, those troops are severely restricted in their ability to effectively fight the enemy and curb his malicious activities. And this is the problem our NATO Allies suffer from both in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Consider for example, the British Navy hostages taken by Iran last year, who were prevented from defending themselves by the Royal Navy's restrictive ROEs. Further consider the case of the German pilots, whose ROEs prohibit them from fighting after dark. While the United States is not perfect in this regard, it certainly has the most liberal ROEs of the NATO countries; a fact which presents us with a huge advantage over our Allies when it comes to actual combat operations.

The second major problem in Afghanistan, referenced earlier today by President Karzai, is, in a word, Pakistan. Indeed, the hard, and perhaps unspeakable truth about the war in Afghanistan is that unless NATO, or someone else, is unable to go in to the mountainous, northern regions of Pakistan and really clean them up, it will be damn near impossible to ensure long-term stability for the nascent Afghani democracy. The nether regions of Pakistan are the tribal areas where the Taliban and al-Qaeda have long maintained a high level of popularity. This is the area where Osama bin Laden, and all other top al-Qaeda and Taliban officials, are most certainly hiding out. More importantly, they are also the areas where al-Qaeda is able to continue to operate their infamous terrorist training camps.

As long as those training camps are allowed to flourish in the Pakistani mountains, Afghani democracy's viability is in serious doubt. President Karzai knows this. All the American troops who have fought there likely know this fact all too well. Heck, both President Bush and Pakistani President Pervez Musharaff also likely know this fact.

Of course, the problem is that here we have hit a kind of Catch-22: Musharaff seems to be unwilling to really go after the al-Qaeda terrorists hiding in his country, mainly for fear of loosing further popularity and his grip on power; however, the United States cannot push for Musharaff's resignation or overthrow, as he is our best bet to prevent Pakistan's nuclear weapons from falling into terrorists' hands.

In other words, we can't live with him; but couldn't do without him.

Yet, something must be done to reconcile Musharaff to the aggressive anti-jihadist policies he practiced immediately after 9/11 and which he (falsely) claims to pursue today. I don't claim to have the answer to what that is - but surely one must be found. Otherwise, Afghanistan will wind up on the fast track to becoming a failed state.